An Empirical Analysis of the Current State of Phishing Attack and Defense

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Outline

1. Mechanics of phishing
2. Rock-phish attacks
3. Who's winning the phishing arm's race?
4. Discussion and conclusions

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Technical requirements for phishing attacks

- Attackers send out spam impersonating banks with link to fake website
- Hosting options for fake website
  - Free webspace (`http://www.bankname.freespacesitename.com/signin/`)
  - Compromised machine (`http://www.example.com/~user/images/www.bankname.com/`)
  - Registered domain (`bankname-variant.com`) which then points to free webspace or compromised machine
- Personal detail recovery
  - Completed forms forwarded to a webmail address
  - Stored in a text file on the spoof website

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Defending against phishing attacks

- Proactive measures
  - Web browser mechanisms to detect fake sites, multi-factor authentication procedures, restricted top-level domains, etc.
  - Not the focus of this paper
- Reactive measures
  - Banks tally phishing URLs
  - Reported phishing URLs are added to a blacklist, which is disseminated via anti-phishing toolbars
  - Banks send take-down requests to the free webspace operator or ISP of compromised machine
  - If a malicious domain has been registered, banks ask the domain name registrar to suspend the offending domain

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Data collection methodology

- Phishing website availability
  - Several organizations collate phishing reports; we selected reports from PhishTank
  - PhishTank DB records phishing URLs and relies on volunteers to confirm whether a site is wicked
  - 33 710 PhishTank reports overs 8 weeks early 2007
  - Unfortunately, PhishTank does not indicate exactly when sites are removed and is regularly misled when sites are not disabled, but rather replaced with generic pages
  - We constructed our own testing system to continuously query sites until they stop responding or change
- Caveats to our data collection
  - Sites removed before appearing in PhishTank are ignored
  - We do not follow web-page redirectors

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Rock-phish attacks

- 'Rock-phish' gang operate different to 'ordinary' phishing sites

1. Purchase several innocuous-sounding domains (e.g., `lof80.info`)
2. Send out phishing email with URL `http://www.volksbank.de.netw.oid3614061.lof80.info/vr`
3. Gang-hosted DNS server resolves domain to IP address of one of several compromised machines
4. Compromised machines run a proxy to a back-end server
5. Server loaded with many fake websites (around 20), all of which can be accessed from any domain or compromised machine

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Rock-phish attacks (cont'd.)

- Rock-phish strategy is more resilient to failure
  - Dynamic pool of domains maps to another pool of IP addresses
- Also increase confusion by splitting the attack components over disjoint authorities
  - Registrars see non-bank domains
  - Compromised machine owners don't see bank webpages

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'Fast-flux' phishing domains

- Rock-phish gang's strategy is evolving fast
- In a fast-flux variant, domains resolve to a set of 5 IP addresses for a short time, then abandon them for another 5
- Burn through 400 IP addresses per week, but the upside (for the attacker) is that machine take-down becomes impractical
- Fast-flux strategy demonstrates just how cheap compromised machines are

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Rock-phish statistics

- Rock-phish sites
  - 18 680 PhishTank reports during 8 week sample (52.6% of all reports)
  - 419 canonical domains
  - 122 IP addresses
  - Impersonated 21 banks and 3 other organizations
- Fast-flux sites
  - 1 803 PhishTank reports
  - 67 domains
  - 2 995 IP addresses
  - Impersonated 18 banks and 10 other organizations

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Rock-phish site activity per day



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New and removed rock-phish domains per day



Correlation coefficient r: 0.368

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New and removed rock-phish IPs per day



Correlation coefficient r: 0.738

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Rock-phish domain and IP removal per day



Correlation coefficient r: 0.0629

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Phishing-site lifetimes

- 'Ordinary' phishing sites
  - 15 030 reports
  - 1 707 unique sites alive upon inspection

	Sites	Mean lifetime (hours)	Median lifetime (hours)
Non-rock	1 707	58.38	20
Rock domains	419	94.26	55
Rock IPs	122	124.9	25
Fast-flux domains	67	454.4	202
Fast-flux IPs	2 995	124.6	20

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Histogram of phishing-site lifetimes



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And now for some curve fitting







	Lognormal				Kolmogorov-Smirnov	
	μ	Std err.	σ	Std err.	D	p-value
Non-rock	3.009	0.03553	1.468	0.02512	0.03878	0.1996
Rock domains	3.924	0.05942	1.216	0.04202	0.06426	0.4158
Rock IPs	3.314	0.1656	1.829	0.1171	0.08945	0.7007

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User response to phishing

- Webalizer data
  - Web page usage statistics are sometimes set up by default in a wold-readable state
  - Gives daily updates of which URLs are visited
  - We can view how many times a 'thank you' page is visited
  - We automatically checked all sites reported to PhishTank for the Webalizer package, revealing over 700 sites
- On-site text files
  - We retrieved around two dozen text files with completed user details from phishing sites
  - 200 of the 414 responses appeared legitimate

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User responses to phishing sites over time



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Estimating the cost of phishing attacks

- Having measured how many phishing sites exist, how long they stick around, and how many people give away their details, we can estimate the losses due to phishing
- DISCLAIMER: Cost is the product of several fuzzy estimates
  1. 1 448 banking phishing sites implies 9 437 p.a.
  2. 57 hours on average implies 33 victims per site
  3. Gartner estimate cost of identity theft to be $572 per victim
  4. $9\,437 * 33 = 311\,449$ victims $* \$572 = \$178.1$m

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Estimating the cost of phishing attacks (cont'd.)

- Estimate ignores rock-phish and fast-flux
  - Since rock-phish account for a large proportion of spam, we assume that they are at least as successful as ordinary phishing sites
  - Our final minimum cost estimate: $350m p.a.
- Gartner estimates 3.5m people fall victim to identity theft at a cost of $2Bn p.a.
  - Part of the disparity can be accounted for our conservative counting of sites
  - The difference can also be accounted for by other types of identity theft (theft of merchant databases, Trojan programs operating keyloggers, etc.)

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Do weekends adversely impact phishing site removal?



Phishing site lifetime by weekday (left) and number of reported phishing sites by weekday (right)

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Discussion (cont'd.)

- Collusion dividend for rock-phish gang
  - Cooperation has strengthened the gang: pooling resources to swap between machines while impersonating many banks per domain
  - Should have attracted more attention from the banks, but perhaps sum-of-efforts nature of the cooperation enables banks to free-ride off each other's vigilance
- Countermeasures
  - Direct tactics like reducing the # of compromised machines available or rate-limiting domain registration appears futile
  - Transparency could help: publishing take-down performance by bank, ISP and country may pressure improvements
  - Increasing awareness to targeted banks of rock-phish tactics may trigger cooperation

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Conclusions

- We have established that there is wide disparity in phishing site lifetimes
  - Heavy-tailed distribution of lifetimes implies that a few long-lived sites are undermining the effectiveness of take-down countermeasures
  - Disparity also suggests there is room for improvement through better monitoring
- We have also seen that attackers innovate: rock-phish sites outlive ordinary phishing sites through clever adaptations in strategy
- For more: `http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~twm29/`

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Number of phishing sites per bank



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Phishing-site lifetimes per bank (only banks >= 5 sites)



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