Survival analysis techniques for studying cybercrime

Tyler Moore

Computer Science & Engineering Department, SMU, Dallas, TX

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Notes

Outline

Notes

Guide to analyzing data

Type of Data	Exploration	Statistics	RByEx
1 numerical variable		one way t-test, Wilcox test	6.3
1 categorical variable		–	3.1
# categories=2	–	`prop.test`	6.2
1 categorical, 1 numerical		anova, Permutation	10
# categories=2	–	2-way t, Wilcox test, Perm.	6.4
2 categorical variables		χ^2 test	3.2–3.5

Notes

Case-control study: spear phishing and academic specialty



Paper available for download in Blackboard: "Who's next? Identifying risk factors for subjects of targeted attacks"

Notes

The odds ratio

	Case (afflicted)	Control (not afflicted)
Exposed (has risk factor)	p_{11}	p_{10}
Not exposed (no risk factor)	p_{01}	p_{00}

$$\text{odd's ratio} = \frac{p_{11} * p_{00}}{p_{10} * p_{01}}$$

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Odds ratios for academic subjects in spear phishing study

Subject Code	Subject	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval
A	Medicine & Dentistry	0.15	(0.03 – 0.67)
B	Subject Allied to Medicine	0.61	(0.14 – 2.60)
C	Biological Sciences	0.45	(0.15 – 1.34)
D	Veterinary Science, Agriculture and Related Subjects	0	-
F	Physical Sciences	1.03	(0.21 – 5.19)
G	Mathematical Sciences	0.17	(0.02 – 1.41)
I	Computer Sciences	2.63	(0.50 – 13.72)
J	Technologies	1.033	(0.06 – 16.64)
K	Architecture Building & Planning	0	-
L	**Social Studies**	**11.79**	**(5.21 – 26.70)**
M	Law	2.83	(0.74 – 10.86)
Mailbox		0.300	(0.13 – 0.68)
N	Business & Administrative Studies	0.77	(0.17 – 3.49)
P	Mass Communication & Documentation	2.08	(0.19 – 23.12)
Q	Linguistics, Classics and Related Subjects	3.13	(0.32 – 30.41)
R	European Languages, Literature and Related Subjects	1.03	(0.06 – 16.64)
Staff		0.25	(0.12 – 0.48)
T	**Eastern, Asiatic, African, American and Australasian Languages, Literature and Related Subjects**	**12.03**	**(1.54 – 94.16)**
Unknown		0.94	(0.59 – 1.48)
V	Historical and Philosophical Studies	1.30	(0.34 – 4.92)
W	Creative Arts and Design	1.03	(0.06 – 16.64)

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Illicit online pharmacies

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Illicit online pharmacies

- What do illicit online pharmacies have to do with phishing?
- Both make use of a similar criminal supply chain
  1. **Traffic**: hijack web search results (or send email spam)
  2. **Host**: compromise a high-ranking server to redirect to pharmacy
  3. **Hook**: affiliate programs let criminals set up website front-ends to sell drugs
  4. **Monetize**: sell drugs ordered by consumers
  5. **Cash out**: no need to hire mules, just take credit cards!
- For more: `http://lyle.smu.edu/~tylerm/usenix11.pdf`

Notes

Case-control study: search-redirection attacks



Notes

Case-control study: search-redirection attacks

R code: `http://lyle.smu.edu/~tylerm/courses/econsec/code/pharmaOdds.R`

Data format:

Date	Search Engine	Search Term	Pos.	URL	Domain	Redirects?	TLD
2011-11-03	Google	20 mg ambien overdose	1	http://products.sanofi.us/ambien/ambien.pdf	sanofi.us	False	other
2011-11-03	Google	20 mg ambien overdose	2	http://swift.sonoma.edu/education/newton/newtonsLaws/?20-mg-ambien-overdose	sonoma.edu	False	.EDU
2011-11-03	Google	20 mg ambien overdose	3	http://ambienoverdose.org/about-2/	ambienoverdose.org	False	.ORG
2011-11-03	Google	20 mg ambien overdose	4	http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20090712025803AA10g8Z	yahoo.com	False	.COM
2011-11-03	Google	20 mg ambien overdose	5	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zolpidem	wikipedia.org	False	.ORG
2011-11-03	Google	20 mg ambien overdose	6	http://blocsonic.com/blog	blocsonic.com	False	.COM
2011-11-03	Google	20 mg ambien overdose	7	http://dinarvets.com/forums/index.php?/user/39154-ambien-side-effects/page	dinarvets.com	False	.COM
2011-11-03	Google	20 mg ambien overdose	8	http://sseo.mad.hartford.edu/ssd05/images/?20-mg-ambien-overdose	hartford.edu	True	.EDU
2011-11-03	Google	20 mg ambien overdose	9	http://www.formspring.me/AmbienCheap0n	formspring.me	False	other
2011-11-03	Google	20 mg ambien overdose	11	http://www.drugs.com/pro/zolpidem.html	drugs.com	False	.COM
2011-11-03	Google	20 mg ambien overdose	12	http://www.engineer.tamuk.edu/departments/ieem/images/ambien.html	tamuk.edu	False	.EDU
2011-11-03	Bing	20 mg ambien overdose	1	http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20090712025803AA10g8Z	yahoo.com	False	.COM
2011-11-03	Bing	20 mg ambien overdose	2	http://www.healthcentral.com/sleep-disorders/h/20-mg-ambien-overdose.html	healthcentral.com	False	.COM
2011-11-03	Bing	20 mg ambien overdose	3	http://ambien20mg.com/	ambien20mg.com	False	.COM
2011-11-03	bing	20 mg ambien overdose	4	http://www.chacha.com/question/will-20-mg-of-ambien-cr-get-you-high	chacha.com	True	.COM
2011-11-03	bing	20 mg ambien overdose	5	http://www.rxlist.com/ambien-drug.htm	rxlist.com	True	.COM
2011-11-03	Bing	20 mg ambien overdose	6	http://www.drugs.com/pro/zolpidem.html	drugs.com	False	.COM
2011-11-03	Bing	20 mg ambien overdose	7	http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20111024222432AARFvP8	yahoo.com	False	.COM
2011-11-03	Bing	20 mg ambien overdose	8	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zolpidem	wikipedia.org	False	.ORG
2011-11-03	Bing	20 mg ambien overdose	9	http://www.thefullwiki.org/Sertraline	thefullwiki.org	False	.ORG
2011-11-03	bing	20 mg ambien overdose	10	http://www.rxlist.com/ediuar-drug.htm	rxlist.com	True	.COM
2011-11-03	Bing	20 mg ambien overdose	11	http://www.formspring.me/ambienpill	formspring.me	False	other
2011-11-03	Bing	20 mg ambien overdose	12	http://ambiendosage.net/	ambiendosage.net	False	.NET

Notes

Survival analysis)



Notes

Censored data happens a lot

- Real-world situations
  - Life-expectancy
  - Criminal recidivism rates
- Cybercrime applications
  - Measuring time to remove X (where X=malware, phishing, scam website, ...)
  - Measuring time to compromise
  - Measuring time to re-infection
- Best resource I found on survival analysis in R: `http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/jfox/Courses/soc761/survival-analysis.pdf`

Notes

Survival analysis (package `survival` in R)

- Key challenge: estimating probability of survival when some data points survive at the end of the measurement
  - Solution: use the Kaplan-Meier estimator to compute probabilities that account for samples still alive (`survfit` in R)
- Common qeustion: Are survival functions split over categorical variables statistically different
  - Use the log-rank test (`survfit` in R)
  - Analagous to χ^2 test
- Cox-proportional hazard model is a more sophisticated way to see how multiple variables affect the *hazard rate*
  - Hazard function $h(t)$: expected number of failures during the time period t

Notes

Pharmacy redirection duration by TLD



Notes

Pharmacy redirection duration by PageRank



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Statistics disentangle effect of TLD, PageRank on duration

Cox-proportional hazard model
$h(t) = \exp(\alpha + \text{PageRank}x_1 + \text{TLD}x_2)$

	coef.	exp(coef.)	Std. Err.)	Significance
PageRank	-0.079	0.92	0.0094	$p < 0.001$
`.edu`	-0.26	0.77	0.084	$p < 0.001$
`.net`	0.10	1.1	0.081	
`.org`	0.055	1.1	0.052	
other TLDs	0.34	1.4	0.053	$p < 0.001$

log-rank test: Q=159.6, $p < 0.001$

Notes

Phishing website recompromise

- Full paper: `http://lyle.smu.edu/~tylerm/cs81.pdf`
- What constitutes recompromise?
  - If one attacker loads two phishing websites on the same server a few hours apart, we classify it as one compromise
  - If the phishing pages are placed into different directories, it is more likely two distinct compromises
- For simplicity, we define website recompromise as distinct attacks on the same host occurring ≥ 7 days apart
- 83% of phishing websites with recompromises ≥ 7 days apart are placed in different directories on the server

Notes

The Webalizer



- Web page usage statistics are sometimes set up by default in a world-readable state
- We automatically checked all sites reported to our feeds for the Webalizer package, revealing over 2 486 sites from June 2007–March 2008
- 1 320 (53%) recorded search terms obtained from 'Referrer' header in the HTTP request
- Using these logs, we can determine whether a host used for phishing had been discovered using targeted search

Notes

Types of evil search

- Vulnerability searches: `phpizabi v0.848b c1 hfp1` (unrestricted file upload vuln.), `inurl: com_juser` (arbitrary PHP execution vuln.)
- Compromise searches: `allintitle: welcome paypal`
- Shell searches: `intitle: ''index of'' r57.php`, `c99shell drwxrwx`

Search type	Websites	Phrases	Visits
Any evil search	204	456	1 207
Vulnerability search	126	206	582
Compromise search	56	99	265
Shell search	47	151	360

Notes

One phishing website compromised using evil search

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One phishing website compromised using evil search

1: 2007-11-30 10:31:33 phishing URL reported: http://chat2me247.com /stat/q-mono/pro/www.lloydstsb.co.uk/lloyds_tsb/logon.ibc.html
2: 2007-11-30 no evil search term 0 hits
3: 2007-12-01 no evil search term 0 hits
4: 2007-12-02 phpizabi v0.415b r3 1 hit
5: 2007-12-03 phpizabi v0.415b r3 1 hit
6: 2007-12-04 21:14:06 phishing URL reported: http://chat2me247.com /seasalter/www.usbank.com/online_banking/index.html
7: 2007-12-04 phpizabi v0.415b r3 1 hit

Let's work with the data

R code: http://lyle.smu.edu/~tylerm/courses/econsec/code/surviveEvil.R

Data format:

TLD	1st Compromise	2nd Compromise	# days	Censored	Evil searches?
com	2008-01-28	2008-03-31	63	0	TRUE
com	2007-11-23	2008-03-31	129	0	TRUE
IP	2008-01-16	2008-03-31	75	0	TRUE
com	2008-01-16	2008-03-31	75	0	TRUE
com	2007-10-28	2007-11-06	8	1	TRUE
com	2008-01-20	2008-03-31	71	0	TRUE
jp	2007-11-12	2008-03-31	140	0	TRUE
nu	2008-01-31	2008-03-31	60	0	TRUE
net	2007-12-27	2008-03-31	95	0	TRUE
com	2008-02-08	2008-03-31	52	0	TRUE
IP	2007-12-07	2008-01-07	31	1	TRUE
IP	2008-01-29	2008-03-31	62	0	TRUE
com	2007-10-22	2007-11-14	22	1	TRUE
com	2008-01-22	2008-03-31	69	0	TRUE

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